









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































	If	we	 didn’t	 pass	 it	 amended…	 the	whole	 four	 years	 (of	 the	 TFA	 negotiation	
process)	would	have	been	a	waste	of	time…	So	we	had	to	pass	a	flawed	piece	
of	legislation	rather	than	send	it	back	(to	the	Legislative	Council)	upstairs	where	
we	were	almost	certain	it	would	die.118		
	
IMLC	Jim	Wilkinson	proposed	amendments	to	improve	the	durability	of	the	bill	despite	his	
personal	opposition	to	the	TFA	process119.	He	recognised	that	the	bill	was	likely	to	pass	and,	
although	he	did	not	support	it,	wanted	it	to	be	the	best	it	could	be120,	as	befits	the	Council’s	
role	of	legislative	review121.	
	Overall,	the	Council	leveraged	the	committee	process	to	significantly	flesh	out	the	bill,	making	
58	successful	amendments	and	adding	over	two	hundred	pages	to	what	was	the	most	heavily	
amended	bill	in	the	Council’s	history122.	This	included	the	addition	of	two	new	Clauses,	a	new	
																																								 																				
112	Wilkinson	Interview.	
113	Farrell	Interview.	
114	Smith	Interview.	
115	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	26	March	2013,	p.	1-65.	
116	The	Hon	C	Farrell	MLC,	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	16	April	2013,	p.	9.	
117	O’Connor	Interview.	
118	O’Connor	Interview.	
119The	Hon	J	Wilkinson	MLC,	Tasmania,	Legislative	Council,	Hansard,	16	April	2013,	p.	8.	
120	Wilkinson	Interview.	
121	D.	Chalmers,	‘Looking	Forward:	Some	Thoughts	on	the	Operation	of	the	Legislative	Council	in	the	Next	
Century’,	in	A.	Fletcher	(ed.),	Operation	of	the	Legislative	Council:	Discussion	Brief,	Hobart,	Parliament	of	
Tasmania,	1997:	5-15.	
122	Legislative	Council,	Annual	Report	2012-2013,	Hobart,	Legislative	Council	of	Tasmania,	2013.	
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Part	and	seven	new	Schedules,	showing	clear	evidence	of	legislative	and	policy	influence123.	In	
this	case	the	committee	and	review	process	afforded	influence,	involving,	not	just	IMLCs,	
although	they	were	prominent,	and	not	just	those	supportive	of	the	bill.	It	is	for	other	research	
to	determine	whether	or	not	this	influence	was	indeed	politically	motivated124.	Certainly	the	
forest	peace	process	was	a	novel	one,	negotiated	by	conservationists	and	the	forestry	industry,	
and	legislated	for	by	a	government	bill	that	was	heavily	amended	in	the	Council.	
	
DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSIONS	
Literature	describing	the	power	of	Tasmania’s	Legislative	Council	tends	to	focus	on	its	
staggered	elections	and	its	capacity	to	block	budgets	without	having	to	face	the	electorate.	
There	is	some	recognition	of,	and	focus	upon,	the	continuously	independent	nature	of	the	
Council,	the	implications	for	its	accountability,	and	parties’	sporadic	attempts	to	pick	up	seats.	
However,	nothing	previously	has	been	written	about	the	means	by	which	independent	
members	influence,	in	their	view,	policy	and	pursue	their	own	agendas125.	It	is	clear	from	this	
research	that	such	members	do	use	the	Council’s	powers	to	influence	policy,	but	also	to	
primarily	ensure	that	legislation,	supported	or	otherwise,	is	of	the	highest	standards.	
For	reasons	of	scope,	we	have	limited	our	investigation	into	the	influence	of	IMLCs.	We	have	
not	undertaken	politicisation	analysis,	for	example,	and	instead	considered	IMLCs’	action	as	
impartial	despite	many	having	seen	it	as	conservatively	aligned.	We	have	not	been	concerned	
with	how	politics	is	prosecuted	in	a	Westminster	house	of	review,	therefore,	but	with	
opportunities	for,	and	instances	of,	influence	being	pursued	in	the	uniquely	independent	
Legislative	Council.	Not	surprisingly	these	opportunities	and	instances	arise	in	the	course	of	
the	Council’s	normal	review	and	scrutiny	work,	although	some	IMLCs	strategies	are	more	
successful	than	others,	as	we	have	seen.	And	some	take	longer	to	be	realised	than	others.	
Nevertheless,	one	of	our	interviewees	did	comment	on	politicisation.	Most	obviously,	
independents	may	front	for	parties	that	are	seeking	influence	and	control	of	the	Council	or	its	
																																								 																				
123	Legislative	Council,	Annual	Report	2012-2013.	
124	See	Schirmer,	Dare	and	Ercan,	Deliberative	Democracy	and	the	Tasmanian	Forest	Peace	Process.	
125	Despite	the	lack	of	previous	qualitative	research,	historical	description	and	information	may	be	gleaned	from	
the	annual	‘Tasmanian	Political	Chronicle’	of	the	Australian	Journal	of	Politics	and	History;	W.	A.	Townsley,	The	
Government	of	Tasmania,	St	Lucia,	Qld,	University	of	Queensland	Press,	1976,	pp	81-84;	and	from	A.	Scott	and	S.	
Young,	The	Tasmanian	Legislative	Council	as	a	House	of	Review:	An	analysis	of	the	process	of	review	of	legislation	
by	the	Legislative	Council	from	July	1989	to	December	1993,	A	Research	Project	commissioned	by	the	Board	of	
Inquiry	into	the	Size	and	Constitution	of	the	Tasmanian	Parliament,	Hobart,	December	1994.	
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members	and	processes.	Party	aligned	independents	could	then	review	government	business,	
and	initiate	inquiries,	in	terms	of	party	interests	rather	than	electorate	or	state	interests.	They	
may	alienate,	marginalise	or	attempt	to	shut	down	any	sign	of	true	independence	by	an	IMLC,	
such	as	by	Ruth	Forrest	for	example,	who	is	active	in	speaking	her	mind,	in	particular	in	
critiquing	state	finances	and	accountability	processes126.	Conversely,	Craig	Farrell,	previously	
LGLC	and	now	President	of	the	Council,	considers	his	independence	to	be	critical,	and	
unhindered	by	his	membership	of	the	Labor	party127.	
Our	findings	are	that	despite	its	long	held	reputation	as	conservative	and	obstructionist,	the	
data	suggests	that	the	Council	plays	a	healthy,	but	not	obstructive	role	in	amending,	but	not	
overly	amending,	legislation,	although	clearly	the	TGA	bill	was	an	exception.	Private	members	
bills	appear	to	play	a	marginal	but	at	times	potentially	an	important	role,	less	so	by	their	
direct	adoption,	but	often,	according	to	our	interviewees,	by	influencing	government	
legislative	initiatives	at	a	later	stage.	IMLCs	have	a	blocking	majority	in	the	Council,	so	it	is	
crucial	that	government	cultivates	good,	reciprocal	working	relations	with	them.	In	turn,	
where	this	is	the	case,	an	IMLC	may	secure	a	policy	win	just	by	having	a	conversation	with	a	
Minister128	but	do	so,	our	interviewees	stressed,	not	for	personal	gain,	but	for	achieving	the	
best	outcomes	for	the	State.	
We	found	that	IMLCs	use	the	committee	process	as	intended,	namely	to	scrutinise	the	
executive,	but	that	they	can	leverage	this	process	aggressively	against	the	wishes	of	
government	by	seeking	enhanced	public	deliberation	and	evidence	gathering.	While	
government	may	resist	this,	it	invariably	recognises	the	power	of	these	committees,	and	
respects,	and	very	often	implements,	their	recommendations.	We	found	that	it	may	also	
choose	to	ignore	them,	only	to	subsequently	offer	its	own	version	of	these	recommendations	
as	its	own	initiative.	In	all	of	their	review	and	scrutiny	work,	IMLCs	are	sole	operators,	not	
supported	by	party	colleagues	or	resources,	and	can	be	denied	access	to	drafting	services,	so	
they	are	on	their	own	and	must	build	relations	to	gain	support.	However	most	of	our	
interviewees	saw	benefit	in	lack	of	party	alignment	for	affording	a	broader	range	of	working	
relationships.	
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128	Smith	Interview.	
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We	observed	that	government	does	not	respond	well	to	attempts	by	the	Council	to	increase	
its	powers.	Whilst	IMLC	Jim	Wilkinson’s	PMB	led	to	more	regular	reporting	of	financial	data,	
IMLC	Ruth	Forrest’s	PMB	attempt	to	scrutinise	regulations	before	they	were	enacted	failed.	
There	is	much	research	still	to	be	undertaken	of	the	Council.	The	electorate	work	and	
priorities	of	MLCs	is	undocumented,	as	is	the	MLC/IMLC	dynamic,	and	MLC/IMLC	follow	
through	on	campaign	promises.	Our	focus	was	on	the	opportunities	for	policy	influence	of	
IMLCs	who	dominate	the	Council.	We	asked	IMLCs	about	their	role,	the	strategies	they	use	to	
gain	policy	influence,	their	work	and	influence	on	committees,	and	the	obstacles,	including	
party	political	obstacles,	to	achieving	influence.	Virtually	all	of	our	interviewees	see	their	role,	
not	only	as	reviewing	and	scrutinising	government,	but	also	as	exerting	initiative	and	
influencing	policy,	which	on	the	whole,	they	do	see	as	part	of	the	function	of	IMLCs	in	an	
upper	house	of	review.	
	
